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The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea:
A Great Mistake?

JILLAINE SEYMOUR*

ABSTRACT

This articlediscusses the InternationalTribunalforthe Law of the Sea and questions its role and value. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea seems to contemplatefairly extensivejurisdictionforthe Tribunal,but since its inception, the Tribunal
has heard a very limited number and scope of cases, in part because disputants have
other optionsfor adjudication.This articleprovides a detailed discussion of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunalhas compulsoryjurisdictionin "promptrelease"
cases and in claimsfor provisionalmeasures where the arbitraltribunalbefore which
the claim will ultimately be brought has not yet been constituted. These two types of
jurisdictioncomprise the majority ofapplicationsto the Tribunal.This articlesuggests
ways that the Tribunal might seek to expand its competence and relevance and contribute to the interpretationof the Convention.
INTRODUCTION

The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea' (UNCLOS or Convention) not only introduced comprehensive substantive change to the law of the
sea, but also introduced a system of compulsory jurisdiction, which included the
creation of a standing international tribunal, the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (Tribunal). The Convention appears to vest this Tribunal with
very broad jurisdiction-the Tribunal is open to nonparties and is arguably capable of hearing disputes beyond those based on the Convention.

*Fellow and Lecturer, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, United Kingdom. This article is
based on the Snyder Lecture delivered at Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington on
March 23, 2005. I am grateful for the helpful comments made by the members of the faculty. Any
errors remain my own.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], available at http//www.un.org/DeptsAos/convention-agreements/texts/
unclos/unclose.pdf.
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However, in the aftermath of the recent election of seven members,2 the Tribunal's role and value might reasonably be questioned.' Despite the potential
breadth of its jurisdiction and the apparent compulsion contained in the Convention, in the more than ten years since the Convention entered into force, the
Tribunal has had just thirteen claims come before it, only two of which were
brought on the merits and only one of which-M/VSaiga (No. 2), 4 the first case
brought before the Tribunal-was heard to judgment. The Tribunal's jurisdiction has been almost exclusively limited to what might be referred to as "incidental proceedings"-claims for provisional measures and for the prompt
release of vessels which have been arrested,' ordinarily for contravening coastal
states' regulations regarding fishing in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Even before the Tribunal's establishment, it was argued that an additional
standing tribunal was simply not necessary given the availability of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and arbitration, both with existing expertise in the
law of the sea. 6 Does the past decade support Shigeru Oda's prediction that the
7
Tribunal "will prove to have been a great mistake"?

2. Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Election of Seven Members of
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, ITLOS/Press 96 (June 23, 2005), available at
http://www.itlos.org/news/press-release/2005/press-release96-en.pdf.
3. See Vaughan Lowe & Robin Churchill, The InternationalTribunalforthe Law ofthe Sea: Surveyfor 2001, 17 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 463, 484 (2002).
4. M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 120 I.L.R. 143 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999),
availableat http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case detail.pl ?id=2&lang=en.
5. This view appears to be endorsed by the Tribunal in M/VSaiga (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 110
I.L.R. 737, 753 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1997), available at http'//www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/
case-detai.plid= 1&lang=en. However, the minority opinions disagreed with the categorization
of the prompt release jurisdiction as "provisional." Vaughan Lowe, The MA Saiga: The First Case
in the InternationalTribunalforthe Law ofthe Sea, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 187, 191-92 (1999).
6. See ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 21-22
(1991); Shigeru Oda, Dispute Settlement Prospects in the Law of the Sea, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 863,
864 (1995). The further concerns of fragmentation of international law are touched upon, but not
dealt with in any detail, in this article. Compare Alan E. Boyle, Dispute Settlement and the Law of
the Sea Convention:Problems ofFragmentationand Jurisdiction,46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 37,54 (1997),
with Jonathan I. Charney, The Implications of Expanding InternationalDispute Settlement Systems:
The 1982 Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (1996).
7. Oda, supra note 6, at 864.
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I.

THE

1982 U.N.

CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

A. Dispute Settlement Provisions
The dispute settlement provisions in the 1958 Convention on the Law of the
Sea' were contained in an optional protocol. 9 However, in relation to the 1982
Convention, arguments in favor of obligatory and binding third-party procedures prevailed. It was argued that the "interpretation and application of an instrument containing so many innovations was bound to generate disputes which
could only be resolved by the use of a third party procedure which was obligatory ... and binding" and that knowledge of the possibility of such procedures
"discourages unreasonableness and so acts as a means of dispute avoidance.""
The inclusion of compulsory dispute settlement provisions was considered to be
a key step forward. The dispute settlement mechanisms, primarily contained in
Part XV, are a complex set of provisions providing for a combination of resort to
existing procedures (the ICJ and arbitration), adjudication by a new specialist
court (the Tribunal), and exclusion of certain classes of matters, which are effec12
tively left either to states" or to other specialist bodies.
B. FundamentalPrinciples
The dispute settlement procedures under the UNCLOS are based on a
number of fundamental principles. 3 Parties are obliged to settle their disputes
by peaceful means. 4 No reservations to the Convention are allowed, 5 and,
therefore, the parties are required to accept dispute settlement in accordance
8. United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29,1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; United Nations Convention on the High Seas, April 29,
1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11; United Nations Convention on Fishing and Conservation
of the Living Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138,559 U.N.T.S. 285.
9.

JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: IN-

STITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES

86 (1999).

10. J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 185 (4th ed. 2005).
11. Such as, for example, calculation of the total allowable catch in the EEZ.
12. Such as, for example, the Commission on Continental Shelf Margins.
13. UNCLOS, supra note 1, part XV, § 1.
14. Id. art. 279; see aLo id. art. 283(1) (requiring parties, when a dispute arises, to "proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views" as to the means of settlement to be adopted).
15. Id. art. 309.
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with Part XV. However, a further fundamental principle is freedom of choice,
and so Part XV 6 gives states the right to settle any dispute between them by
peaceful means of their own choosing. Clearly this affects the extent to which the
UNCLOS dispute settlement provisions can be said to be "compulsory," but it is
clear that this provision was crucial to the acceptability of the Convention's dis7
pute settlement provisions.'
C. Application of the Compulsory Dispute Settlement Procedures
If the parties to a dispute have agreed upon a particular means of settlement,
the UNCLOS compulsory procedures will apply only if such means prove unsuccessful, if the agreement between the parties does not exclude any further
procedure,' 8 and if the dispute concerns the interpretation or application of the
Convention.
Furthermore, the compulsory procedures are subject to a number of substantive exceptions. Article 297 provides that certain types of disputes are not included in the compulsory dispute settlement process.19 The UNCLOS also
permits states to opt out of the compulsory procedures in relation to particular
disputes.2" These articles acknowledge that, for some states, acceptance of the
UNCLOS was contingent on the exclusion of some sensitive areas from the
Convention's dispute settlement procedures. 2 The question of the disputes that
are excluded from the compulsory jurisdiction procedures will be left to one side
because these exclusions do not impact the Tribunal in particular, but rather are
part of the landscape of the UNCLOS. However, as Oda notes, any assessment
16. Id. art. 280.
17. Charney,supra note 6, at 73.
18. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 281.
19. 1d. art. 297 (excluding disputes concerning the exercise by a coastal state of its sovereign
rights or jurisdiction, its exercise of a right or discretion to regulate marine scientific research in its
EEZ or continental shelf, and its exercise of its sovereign rights with respect to the living resources
in the EEZ).
20. Id. art. 298. States can opt out of the compulsory dispute settlement procedures in relation to
disputes concerning military and law-enforcement activities and sea-boundary delimitation, as
well as disputes in respect of which the U.N. Security Council is exercising its functions and
claims to historic bays or titles.
21. The excluded disputes "touch upon vital interests of the State, such as the State's boundaries,
security and some aspects of its control over its offshore resources." R. R. CHURCHILL & A. V
LowE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 455 (3d ed. 1999). See also Boyle, supra note 6, at 41-47 (raising the potential difficulties in defining whether a dispute falls outside the compulsory procedures).
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of the dispute settlement procedures under the Convention has to be made in
22
light of the significant exceptions to those procedures.
Where the compulsory dispute settlement procedures do apply, states have
four main choices 23 for dispute settlement: the Tribunal, 24 the ICJ, an arbitral tribunal, 25 or a special arbitral tribunal. 26 These four options represent four views
that emerged when trying to determine what the compulsory method should be.
There were those who advocated the need for a new tribunal to deal with innovations contained in the UNCLOS. Others were in favor of the ICJ because of its
existing history of resolving law of the sea disputes. Some preferred the flexibility of arbitration, while others considered that the technical issues raised by
many law of the sea disputes called for the creation of specialized bodies.2 7 All
four views were accommodated as options, but it is noteworthy that a specialist
standing tribunal was created and that it was given a broad jurisdictional ambit.
II.

BREADTH OF THE TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION

There are a number of possible interpretations regarding the extent of the
Tribunal's jurisdiction, both in relation to the nature of the claims that may be
brought before it and in relation to entities that may access the Tribunal. With
regard to the subject matter of claims brought before the Tribunal, there are two
relevant provisions in the UNCLOS: Article 288 of the UNCLOS and Annex
VI, Article 21.
A. Claims within the Tribunal'sJurisdiction
Article 288 refers to the jurisdiction of all the possible compulsory dispute
resolution bodies and relevantly provides that each shall "have jurisdiction over
any dispute concerningthe interpretationor applicationof this Convention which is

22. Oda, supra note 6, at 863.
23. UNCLOS, supra note 1,art. 287(1).
24. See id. Annex VI.
25. Referred to as an Annex VII arbitral tribunal.
26. Referred to as an Annex VIII special arbitral tribunal and which provides for the optional
submission of certain disputes to expert fact-finding on issues of fisheries, marine environment,
marine-scientific research, or navigation.
27. MERRILLS, SUpra note 10, at 185.
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submitted to it in accordance with this Part"28 and that each "shall also have jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretationor applicationofan internationalagreement related to the purposes of the Convention, which is submitted to
it in accordance with the agreement. "29
Article 21 of Annex VI envisages a more expansive jurisdiction and provides
that "the jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all disputes and all applications
submitted in accordance with the Convention, and all matters specifically provided for in any otheragreement which confersjurisdictionon the Tribunal."3
Both articles enable parties to refer any dispute concerning the UNCLOS
and related international agreements to the Tribunal. However, Article 288(2)
arguably limits the Tribunal's consensual jurisdiction3 to the interpretation or
application of any "international agreement relatedto the purposes of the Convention," whereas Annex VI, Article 21 refers to "any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal." Furthermore, Article 288(2) confines the
Tribunal's consensual jurisdiction to "internationalagreements," whereas Article
32
21 refers only to "agreements."
A broad approach based on Article 21 of Annex VI appears to support
claims to use the Tribunal to resolve any dispute, regardless of whether it relates
to the law of the sea or whether it is based on an international agreement. 33 An
agreement to bring the dispute to the Tribunal is all that would be necessary.
There are, of course, arguments that support a restrictive interpretation of
the Tribunal's jurisdiction. For example, Article 1(4) of Annex VI provides that
reference of a dispute to the Tribunal shall be governed by Parts XI and XV,
which suggests that Annex VI is subordinate to Part XV and, therefore, to Article
288. 34 It might also be argued that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited by the
law that it is to apply. Article 293(1) provides that "[a] court or tribunal having

28. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 288(1) (referring to the Tribunal's compulsory jurisdiction)
(emphasis added).
29. Id. art. 288(2) (emphasis added).
30. Id. annex VI, art. 21 (emphasis added).
31. Article 288(1), not surprisingly, limits the compulsory jurisdiction of the Tribunal to cases
concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS. Id. art. 288(1).
32. See GUDMUNDUR EIRIKSSON, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 112-13
(2000).
33. Boyle, supra note 6, at 47-50.
34. EtIKSSON,Supra note 32, at 113-14 (referring also to Annex VI, Article 32(2) on the right of
intervention by third parties, which refers to "international agreements" and seems to refer back
to Article 288(2), but could be read as limiting the right to intervene). Eiriksson also notes that
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jurisdiction under this section shall apply this Convention and other rules of
international law not incompatible with this Convention." ' 5
This conflict might be resolved by noting that Article 293 refers to law applicable to a court or tribunal "having jurisdiction under this section,"3 6 and is
therefore arguably only applicable if the parties are relying on jurisdiction under
the section in which Article 293 appears, that is, Part XV, Section 2, but that it is
not applicable to applications made under Annex VI, Article 21. However, it has
been suggested that the scope of Article 293 is even narrower than this and does
not apply to any jurisdiction based on Part XV, Section 2, but only applies to the
Tribunal's compulsory jurisdiction under this section. Part XV, Section 2 refers
not only to the Tribunal's compulsory jurisdiction, but to its consensual jurisdiction, as well. 3 7 Alan Boyle argues that Article 293 does not determine the applicable law in consensual cases.38 Support for this interpretation of Article 293 is
found in Article 288(2)," 9 which provides that a court or tribunal can have jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of an international agreement "related to the purposes of the Convention."40 It would
arguably be odd if the law applicable in these situations was confined to the Convention and other international law not incompatible with it.
B. Access to the Tribunal
The Tribunal is clearly open to States Parties.4' However, reference to
Annex VI, Article 20(2) supports the argument that the Tribunal's consensual
jurisdiction is also open "to entities other than States Parties ...in any case subwhen the Tribunal supplemented its limited advisory jurisdiction, it confined its jurisdiction to
requests made pursuant to international agreements related to the purposes of the Convention. Id.

at 143 (referring to

INT'L TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, RULES OF THE TRIBUNAL

art. 138,

ITLOS/8 (Apr. 27, 2005) [hereinafter ITLOS RULES], available at http://www.itlos.org/
documents-publications/documents/Itlos.8.E.27.04.05.pdf).
35. UNCLOS, supra note 1,art. 293(1). However, Article 293(2) provides that "[plaragraph I
does not prejudice the power of the court or tribunal to decide a case ex aequo et bono ["according
to what is equitable and good"], if the parties so agree." Id. art. 293(2).
36. Id. art. 293(1).
37. See id. art. 288(2).
38. Boyle, supra note 6, at 48-49.
39. See UNCLOS, supra note 1,part XV, § 2.
40. Id. art. 288(2).
41. Id. annex VI, art. 20(1). Article 1(2)(2) extends the application of the Convention to the entities
entitled to sign it pursuant to Article 305, which includes international organizations. Id. art. 1(2)(2).
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mitted pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal
which is accepted by all the parties to that case."42 Boyle accepts that "Iv]iews
may differ on whether this is a strained reading of Annex VI or whether it corresponds with the intention of the drafters," but concludes that it makes "consid3
erable sense" to enable entities other than States Parties to access the Tribunal.
This is in contrast to the ICJ, which is clearly only open to states,44 and in contrast
to Annex VII and VIII arbitral tribunals, which appear to be open only to States
Parties.45
If the Tribunal is open to entities other than States Parties, this provides further support for a broad interpretation of the potential subject matter of the Tribunal's consensual jurisdiction. It would make little sense to enable other entities
to bring claims before the Tribunal but to then limit the law applicable to their dispute to "the Convention and other international law not incompatible with it."46
It is submitted that the objections to a broad jurisdiction cannot hold and
that an expansive interpretation of the Tribunal's consensual jurisdiction must
prevail. In addition to more detailed arguments based on the text of the Convention, "if parties to a dispute wish to take it to the Tribunal, it is difficult to see
47
why they should not be allowed to do so."
Despite the creation of this specialist standing tribunal with its potentially
extensive jurisdiction, the claims brought before it have been limited both in
number and in scope. This inevitably raises the question of why its work has
been restricted. As already noted, the compulsory dispute settlement procedures
under the 1982 Convention are based on the principle of freedom of choicestates are entitled to choose which dispute settlement process they would like to

42. Annex VI, Article 20 is noted without comment by LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 61 n.4.
The Seabed Disputes Chamber of the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the variety of entities that
may be involved in a dispute in relation to exploitation of the seabed, including state enterprises,
private contractors, and the International Seabed Authority. UNCLOS, supra note 1,art. 187.
43. Boyle, supra note 6, at 52-53 (noting that access to the Tribunal is, in any event, possible in
arbitration).
44. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1059, 3
Bevans 1186. Rights of intervention are the same for both the ICJ and the Tribunal. Compare id.
arts. 62-63, 59 Stat. at 1063, 3 Bevans at 1191, with UNCLOS,supra note 1, annex VI, art. 32.
45. Neither Annex VII or VIII contain an article similar to Annex VI, Article 20(2), and it
would appear, therefore, that other entities would not have standing before these tribunals. See
COLLIER & LowE,supm note 9, at 90-91.
46. UNCLOS, supra note 1,art. 293.
47. Boyle, supra note 6, at 50.

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA

apply, both prior to any dispute arising and after a dispute has arisen. It is only if
dispute settlement based on choice fails that the compulsory procedures take effect. It is therefore relevant to examine the extent to which states can and do
choose to bring claims to the Tribunal.

III.

CHOICE OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE

Obviously, disputants are free to choose the Tribunal at the point at which a
dispute arises. However, this possibility is subject to the practical limitation that,
where parties are already in dispute, it is difficult for them to reach agreement as
to which forum should adjudicate that dispute when there is a choice. This is not
to say that such agreement is impossible. But, to date, only two claims have come
before the Tribunal by agreement, and in only one of those, M/VSaiga (No. 2),"
has the Tribunal reached a decision on the merits. In the Case Concerning the
Conservation and SustainableExploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South -Eastern
Pacific Ocean,49 the parties agreed to submit their dispute to a chamber of the
Tribunal pursuant to Annex VI, Article 15.5 However, the parties reached a
provisional arrangement in relation to the dispute, and proceedings before the
chamber have been suspended until January 1, 2008."'

48. The parties agreed to transfer the arbitration proceedings instituted by Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines to the Tribunal in February 1998. See M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea)
(Request for Provisional Measures), 117 I.L.R. 111, 114-15 paras. 12-15 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea
1998). The Tribunal found that Guinea's seizure oftheM/VSaiga had violated a number of Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines' rights under the Convention and international law and ordered
compensation. See M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St Vincent v. Guinea) (Admissibility and Merits), 120 I.L.R.
143 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999).
49. Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the
South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. European Community) (Order 2000/3 of 20 December
2000), 40 I.L.M. 475 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2000), availableat http'//www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/
case-detai.plid=6&lang=en.
50. Id. Chile had instituted the Annex VII arbitral procedure and had asked the president of the
Tribunal to appoint an arbitrator, but, after consultation, it agreed to submit the dispute to a
chamber of the Tribunal. See generally Vaughn Lowe, The InternationalTribunalforthe Law of the
Sea: Survey for 2000, 16 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 549, 567-69 (2001).
51. Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the
South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. European Community) (Order 2001/1 of 15 March 2001)
(Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001), http'//www.itlos.org/case-documents2001/document-en_99.pdf;
id. (Order 2005/1 of 29 December 2005) (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2003), http://www.itlos.org/
start2_en.html. This agreement also suspends the WTO proceedings between the parties.
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The Convention also makes provision for States Parties to choose, prior to
any dispute arising, any of the four means for dispute settlement nominated in
Article 287(1). In the event of a dispute, if both parties have selected the same forum, it goes to that body, unless they otherwise agree.5 Many states have made
no choice at all,53 but of the thirty-three states that had chosen as of September 9,
2005, the Tribunal is in fact a popular choice. Eleven States Parties nominated
the Tribunal as their only first choice,5 4 and nine nominated the Tribunal and
55
the ICJ as their equal first choices.
However, Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe argue that those relatively
few states that have selected the Tribunal as their preferred forum for the compulsory settlement of disputes are so geographically diverse that it seems highly
unlikely that a dispute could arise between some of them.56 While there have
been cases between geographically distant states in the Tribunal,57 these claims
were brought before the Tribunal on the basis of its compulsory prompt release
jurisdiction, 58 and those few claims that have come before the Tribunal on some
other basis demonstrate the expected geographical proximity.59
52. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 287 para 4.
53. As of September 16,2005, there were 149 States Parties to UNCLOS, and as of September 9,
2005,35 of those States Parties had made Article 287 declarations. Successive presidents of the Tribunal and the U.N. General Assembly have urged more states to make Article 287 declarations.
Robin Churchill, The InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea: Survey for 2003, 19 INT'L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 369 (2004).
54. In addition, Canada nominates the Tribunal and Annex VII arbitration as equal first
choices, and Belarus, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine all nominate the Tribunal "in respect of the prompt release of detained vessels or their crews." Division for Ocean Affairs and the
Law of the Sea, United Nations, Settlement of Disputes Mechanism: Recapitulative Tables, http'/
www.un.org/Depts/los/settlement of disputes/choice.procedure.htm.
55. In addition, Portugal's declaration nominates all four options and Mexico nominates the
Tribunal, the ICJ, and Annex VIII arbitration as equal first choices. A further seven states nominate the ICJ as their only first choice. Only two states nominate Annex VII arbitration as their
only first choice. Id.
56. Robin Churchill & Vaughan Lowe, The InternationalTribunalforthe Law of the Sea: Survey
for 2002, 18 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 447, 456 (2003) (referring to Austria and Uruguay, and
Croatia and Tanzania as examples).
57. See, e.g., Volga (Russ. v. Austl.), 126 I.L.R. 433 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2002), available at
http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case detail.pl ?id =1 l&lang=en.
58. See infra Part IV.A.
59. See generally Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan) (Austl. v. Japan), 117 I.L.R. 148
(Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999), available at http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/
casedetail.plid=3&lang=en; MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), 126 I.L.R. 259 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea
2001), available at http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case-detail.pl?id=10&lang=en;
Case
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Prior agreement to submit a dispute to the Tribunal may also be found in
some other treaty, and there are several multilateral agreements which confer
jurisdiction on the Tribunal. Of the seven agreements listed on the Tribunal's
website containing provisions relating to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 6 four
are now in force. 6 Moreover, a fifth, the 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,6 - had,
63
as of October, 31, 2005, twenty-one of the necessary twenty-six ratifications.
Alternatively, if a preexisting agreement concerning the law of the sea does
not provide for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction, the UNCLOS provides that
jurisdiction can be conferred on the Tribunal if all the parties agree."' Given that
this provision requires the agreement of all parties to a treaty, it has been suggested that it is not "likely that article 22 would be applied in practice." 65 This is
particularly so if the parties to the dispute can simply agree between themselves
to submit the dispute to the Tribunal under Annex VI, Articles 20 and 21.

Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.),
126 I.L.R. 487 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2003), available at http'//www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/
case detail.pl ?id= 12&lang=en. But see Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish
Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. European Community) (Order 2000/3 of 20
December 2000), 40 I.L.M. 175 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2000), availableat http://www.itlos.org/
cgi-bin/cases/casedetail.pl ?id =6&lang=en.
60. The list does not purport to be exhaustive.
61. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Dec. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1547 (entered into
force Dec. 11, 2001); Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, Nov. 24, 1993,33 I.L.M. 968 (entered
into force Apr. 24, 2003); Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources
in the South-East Atlantic Ocean, Apr. 20, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 257 (entered into force Apr. 13, 2003);
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Sept. 5, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 278 (entered into force July 19, 2004). See
also Erik Molenaar, UnregulatedDeep-Sea Fiheries:A Needfora Multi-Level Approach, 19 INT'L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 223, 230 n.38 (2004).
62. 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, Nov. 7, 1996,36 I.L.M. I [hereinafter 1996 Protocol].
63. Summary of Status of Conventions as of 31 October 2005, http://www.imo.org/Conventions/
mainframe.asptopic-id=247 (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). Fifteen of the ratifications must be by
Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter 1972 ("London Convention 1972"). Id.
64. See Boyle, supra note 6, at 48 (suggesting that Annex VI, Article 32 gives jurisdiction over
such treaties, including the London Convention 1972 and the 1973/78 MARPOL Convention).
65. EIRIKSSON, supra note 32, at 124.
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The opportunities for the Tribunal to be selected by agreement are limited
at this time. This could arise if the parties in dispute have nominated the Tribunal as their first choice for dispute settlement under Article 287, if the Tribunal
is nominated as the dispute settlement mechanism in some other treaty to which
the states in dispute are party, or if they agree on the Tribunal when the dispute
arises. This relatively limited consensual recourse to the Tribunal has been the
subject of comment, with successive Tribunal presidents and the U.N. General
Assembly urging greater use of Article 287.'
While it is clear that the costs of maintaining a standing tribunal have to be
justified, 67 arguably the Tribunal's success can only be judged in relation to its
primary competitors, the ICJ and Annex VII tribunals.
The Tribunal's current level of activity does not suffer by comparison to the
position of the ICJ in relation to the 1958 Conventions. The expectation that the
ICJ would play "a prominent role"6 in the settlement of disputes arising under the
1958 Conventions was not realized. Just over thirty states ratified the optional protocol providing for disputes to be referred to the ICJ,69 and no case has been referred to the ICJ under that protocol. 7' The argument that this was attributable to
states' reluctance "to accept an open-ended obligation to submit future disputes,
whose nature is almost impossible to predict, to any particular settlement procedure"'7' applies equally to the Article 287 declarations under the UNCLOS.
Although the Tribunal does not suffer from comparison to the role of the
ICJ in relation to the 1958 Conventions, this leaves open the question of whether,
under the UNCLOS, states prefer the ICJ to the Tribunal. As noted at the outset, there was a view that there was simply no need for another standing court
because the Tribunal's role could be fulfilled by the ICJ. 72 Since the Convention

66. Churchill, supra note 53; Churchill & Lowe, supra note 56, at 455.
67. See Churchill,supra note 53, at 382; Donald R. Rothwell, Buildingon the StrengthsandAddressing the Challenges:The Role ofLaw of the Sea Institutions,35 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 131, 147(2004).
68. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 21, at 453.
69. Unless the parties agreed within a reasonable time upon some other means of peaceful
settlement.
70. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 21, at 453.
71. Id. A similar comment might also be made about the ICJ's Optional Clause jurisdiction.
COLLIER & LowE, supra note 9, at 154-55.
72. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 22 (arguing that the Statute of the ICJ could be amended to
encompass the limited situations in which the Tribunal's competence could be distinguished from
that of the ICJ); Oda, supra note 6, at 864 (arguing that, rather than creating a new tribunal, the
role of the ICJ ought to have been strengthened).
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entered into force in late 1994, applications have been filed with the ICJ that
could have been submitted to the Tribunal. 73 However, there have been relatively few such applications, and it is not clear that they necessarily demonstrate
a general preference for the ICJ compared to the Tribunal. Romania's application in relation to its dispute with the Ukraine 74 is based on a 1997 Treaty on Relations of Co-operation and Good-Neighborliness and an Additional
Agreement under which the parties assume an obligation to conclude a treaty
on, inter alia, the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ in the Black
Sea. Romania relies on a provision of the Additional Agreement as the basis for
the ICJ's jurisdiction. 75 However, Romania did not ratify the UNCLOS until
December 1996, and the Ukraine did not ratify the UNCLOS until July 1999.
Therefore, it is not surprising that their 1997 agreement nominated the ICJ as
the standing tribunal to resolve disputes in the event that negotiations failed.76
The two claims by Nicaragua relied on the Optional Clause77 and the Pact of
Bogoti to establish jurisdiction of the ICJ in circumstances in which one 78 or
both 79 of the parties had not, at the time of the application, made an Article 287

73. This is true particularly given the apparent breadth of its jurisdiction. While combined territorial and maritime delimitation disputes can be excluded, UNCLOS, supra note 1, art.
298(l)(a), even those disputes which can or have been excluded from the compulsory jurisdiction
procedure of the Convention may, nevertheless, be referred to the Tribunal (or other dispute resolution body) by consent. UNCLOS,supranote 1, art. 299.
74. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Application of Sept. 16, 2004, availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iru/iru-applications/iru-applications.pdf.
75. Id. para. 4.
76. While it is arguable that the Tribunal is open to nonparties, that interpretation is yet to be
clearly established and presumably states will only nominate a dispute settlement mechanism if
they are certain that it is open to them to access it. FisheriesJurisdiction(Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J.
432 (Dec. 4, 1998), might also be explained on this basis. Spain's application was filed in March
1995, but Spain did not ratify the Convention until January 1997, and Canada ratified it in November 2003:
77. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 44, art. 36(2).
78. See generally Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Application of Dec. 6,
2001, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/inicol/inicolorder/inicol-iapplication20011206.pdf. Colombia still has not made any Article 287 declaration.
79. See generally Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean
Sea (Nicar. v Hond.), Application of Dec. 8, 1999, available at http'J/www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idocket/iNH/iNHorders/Inh iapplication_19991208.pdf. It should be noted, however, that
since then both states have demonstrated a clear preference for the ICJ, nominating it as their only
first choice tribunal under Article 287-Nicaragua upon ratification on May 3, 2000, and Honduras on June 18, 2002.
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declaration. A number of recent decisions are based on applications made to the
ICJ before the Convention entered into force."0
Reference to the Tribunal's other main competitor, Annex VII tribunals, has,
until very recently, also been limited, with no reported decisions on the merits of
any claim to date. In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, the Annex VII tribunal held
that it did not have jurisdiction over the dispute.8 In MOX Plant, the Annex VII
proceedings have been suspended, due to concerns about an overlap with the exclusive jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), until the ECJ rules on
a related case concerning European Community law issues or the arbitral tribunal
orders otherwise. 2 In 2004, Guyana and Suriname, as well as Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, 83 submitted disputes to Annex VII arbitration, and in early
2005, the Annex VII arbitral tribunal met with the agents of Malaysia and Singapore in relation to their dispute over land reclamation by Singapore in and around
the Straits of Johor.14 This recent activity supports Donald Rothwell's reference to

80. See, e.g., Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of I1 June 1998 in the Case Concerning
the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1999
I.C.J. 31 (where the original application by Cameroon was filed in March 1994); Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salv./Hond.: Nicar. Intervening), Application for Revision of
Judgment of Sept. 10, 2002 (where the parties submitted the dispute in 1986).
81. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Austl. & N.Z. v. Japan) (Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility), 119 I.L.R. 508 (Annex VII arbitral tribunal 2000), availableathttp://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/bluefintuna/awardO8O400.pdf.
82. MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.) (Order No. 4), 126 I.L.R. 310 (Permanent Court of Arbitration
Annex VII arbitral tribunal 2003), availableat http'//www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/MOX/
MOX%200rder%20No4.pdf. An action was brought against Ireland by the Commission of the
European Communities on October 30, 2003, in relation to its instituting proceedings under the
Convention. See Case C-459/03, Comm'n v. Ir., available at http'//curia.eu.int/urisp/cgi-bin/
form.pI Ilang=en&Submit=Submit&alldocs=alldocs&docj=docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&
docjo=docjo&numaff= 459%2F03&datefs =&datefe =&nomusuel =&domaine=&mots=&resmax= 100
(Jan. 10, 2004) (Application). As of December 15,2005, that claim is still pending.
83. See Permanent Court of Arbitration-Recent and Pending Cases, http'//www.pca-cpa.org/
ENGLISH/RPC/#Guyana/Surinam (last visited Jan. 21, 2006); see also Press Release, Permanent
Court of Arbitration, Meeting of the Arbitral Tribunal and the Parties in the Matter of an Arbitration Between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago Pursuant to Annex VII of the Law of the Sea
Convention (Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/BATRI/
BATRIPress23Aug.htm. In both cases the proceedings are to be confidential, but it is expected
that the award will be made public after it has been rendered.
84. Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case Concerning Land Reclamation by
Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) (Jan. 14, 2005), availableat
http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/MASI%20press%20140105.pdf. The claim has now
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"the emerging popularity of recourse to Annex VII I Arbitral] Tribunals."85 However, until a more convincing pattern of submission of disputes to Annex VII tribunals emerges, it is difficult to disagree with Churchill's assessment that the
Tribunal's "lack of activity reflects the limited use that has so far generally been
made of the dispute settlement procedures of the Law of the Sea Convention."86
IV.

COMPULSORY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE

In the event that the parties in dispute cannot agree on a dispute settlement
procedure, or the procedure selected has failed to resolve the dispute, the parties
are deemed by the Convention to have accepted one of the four dispute settlement options. However, despite the creation of a specialist standing tribunal, the
dispute settlement option that the parties are deemed to have accepted is not the
Tribunal but rather Annex VII arbitration. 7 While there were those who supported the proposition that the Tribunal should have residual discretion where
the parties could not agree, attempts to invest the Tribunal with this residual discretion were "completely abandoned" in 1977."8 Likewise, if the parties have selected different tribunals under Article 287, the dispute is referred to an Annex
VII arbitral tribunal unless the parties agree otherwise.
While the Convention does not nominate the Tribunal as the fallback dispute resolution procedure where the parties in dispute fail to agree, there are
three situations in which the Convention, in practice, confers compulsory jurisdiction on the Tribunal, two of which are of particular interest here. These are
"prompt release" cases and cases in which provisional measures are requested in
a dispute that has been submitted to an arbitral tribunal under the Convention's
compulsory jurisdiction, but the tribunal has not yet been formed. 9 The inevibeen settled. Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor
(Malay. v. Sing.) (Award on Agreed Terms), 45 I.L.M. (Permanent Court of Arbitration Annex
VII arbitral tribunal 2005) (forthcoming 2006).
85. Rothwell,supra note 67, at 148.
86. Churchill, supra note 53, at 382.
87. UNCLOS,supra note 1, art. 287(3), (5).
88. A.O. Adede, Prolegomenato the Disputes Settlement Partof the Law ofthe Sea Convention, 10
N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 253, 267-68, 272,278, 291,323,340 (1977).
89. UNCLOS also specifies that disputes concerning activities in the International Seabed Area
go to the Seabed Chamber of the Tribunal. See UNCLOS,supra note 1, art. 287(2). This provision
was welcomed even by those who doubted the value of the Tribunal more generally. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 20; Oda,supra note 6, at 869.
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table urgency involved in both these applications requires that they be heard by
a preestablished judicial body,9" and in contrast to general dispute resolution
procedures, the Tribunal is nominated as the fallback position in the event that
the parties fail to agree.
A. Article 292: Prompt Release
The UNCLOS introduced significant extensions of coastal state jurisdiction
with respect to marine resources, environmental protection, and scientific research. This raised concerns that the coastal state's jurisdiction could interfere unreasonably with foreign shipping, and therefore a number of safeguards were
introduced, including limitations on the legislative jurisdiction of coastal states
and a variety of dispute settlement procedures.9' One of these procedures, the Article 292 provision for prompt release, has dominated the Tribunal's jurisdiction.'
Article 292 provides a limited right of action for a state party when a vessel
flying its flag has been detained by the authorities of another state party. These
cases usually arise in circumstances in which fisheries or naval authorities of the
coastal state suspect that a fishing vessel is illegally fishing in its EEZ. The
coastal state then arrests the vessel and its crew, detaining them at a coastal state
port. The UNCLOS is concerned to protect not only the humanitarian rights of
the crew and the property rights of the vessel's owner, but also the ability of a
coastal state to effectively enforce its regulation of the EEZ. Therefore, Article
292 provides for the prompt release of the vessel upon payment of a reasonable
bond. It enables unilateral application to the Tribunal in the absence of agree93
ment between the flag state and the detaining state.

90. Tullio Treves, The Jurisdiction of the International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea, in THE
115-16 (P. Chandrasekhara Rao & Rahmatullah Khan eds., 2001).
91. Lowe, supra note 5.
92. Seven of the Tribunal's thirteen decisions to date have concerned prompt release. The special and separate nature of prompt release proceedings is recognized by a separate section in the
Rules of the Tribunal. See ITLOS RULES,supra note 34, arts. 110-14.
93. If the parties agree, the Tribunal's Rules provide that the application can be dealt with by the
Chamber of Summary Procedure, although the Convention does not mention this possibility.
Compare ITLOS RULES, supra note 34, art. 112(2), with UNCLOS, supra note 1, annex VI, art.
25(2) (concerning provisional measures). The Rules provide a five-day time limit for the response
of the detaining state in order to allow the full Tribunal to be convened if necessary. In M/VSaiga,
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA: LAW AND PRACTICE 111,

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA

Given the factual circumstances that will precede such a claim, it is not surprising that Article 292(3) requires a court or tribunal dealing with applications
for prompt release to do so without delay. The Tribunal's rules give applications
for prompt release priority over all other proceedings before the Tribunal94 and
emphasize expeditiousness in prompt release cases.95 A hearing is to be held
within fifteen days after receipt of an application,96 and the detaining state is to
97
submit a response at least ninety-six hours before the start of the oral hearing.
The result is that a prompt release case will, as a rule, be dealt with in less than
thirty days from application to reading of the judgment.9 8
The action under Article 292 is limited in nature. The Tribunal's jurisdiction does not extend to every case in which a vessel or its crew has been detained,
but only to cases in which it is alleged "that the detaining State has not complied
with the provisions of this Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or its
crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security.""0
While vessels may be detained by a coastal state in a number of situations,
there are only three provisions permitting detention of vessels in the Convention
that require prompt release upon the posting of a bond.' 0 These three provisions

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines requested that the application be heard by a chamber, but there
was no response from Guinea within five days, so the application was heard by the full Tribunal.
M/V Saiga (St. Vincent v. Grenadines), 110 I.L.R. 737, 741 para. 5. Eiriksson expresses the view
that it was, in retrospect, desirable that the first case was heard by the full Tribunal. EiRiKssoN,
supra note 32, at 206.
94. ITLOS Rui.s,supra note 34, art. 112(1). Second in priority are requests for the prescription
of provisional measures, and where seized at the same time of both, the Tribunal is to take the necessary measures to ensure that both are dealt with without delay. Id. arts. 90(1), 112(1). Decisions
on the intervention of third parties in proceedings are also to be taken as a matter of priority. See
id. art. 102; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Annex VI of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) arts. 31-32 (Dec. 10, 1982), available at http'//
www.itlos.org/documents-publications/documents/statuteen.pdf [hereinafter Annex VI 1.
95. The Rules were revised and the relevant time limits extended in 2001. See Lowe &
Churchill, supra note 3, at 466.
96. ITLOS Ru.Es, supra note 34, art. 112(3). Previously, the hearing was to be held within 10
days after receipt. Lowe & Churchill, supra note 3, at 466.
97. ITLOS RuLEs, supra note 34, art. 111(4). Previously, the response was required within 24
hours. Lowe& Churchill,supra note 3, at 466.
98. Previously, the release case was to be dealt with within 21 days. Lowe & Churchill, supra
note 3, at 466.
99. UNCLOS, supra note 1,art. 292(1).
100. See M/V Saiga (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 110 I.L.R. 737, 750 para. 52 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea
1997) (citing UNCLOS,supra note 1, arts. 73(2), 220(6)-(7), 226(l)(c)).
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are concerned with the conservation and management of living resources in the
EEZ and with the protection and preservation of the marine environment. If,
for example, a state was successfully to argue that a vessel had been arrested for
breach of customs measures, the flag state would not be able to apply unilaterally
for prompt release of the vessel, and the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction on
12
this basis."0 ' This restrictive interpretation of Article 292 has judicial support, 1
which relies on the travauxpreparatoires.°3 Therefore, the Tribunal has historically refused to consider arguments based on the breach of any other provision of
the Convention, not even those provisions which have a close connection with
prompt release. For example, the Tribunal has held that it cannot consider
claims that the coastal state has breached Article 73(4) of the Convention by failing promptly to notify the flag state of the arrest or detention of a vessel and any
penalties imposed.' °4
The Tribunal's prompt release jurisdiction is also constrained by the requirement that the Tribunal shall deal with the question of release without prejudice to the merits of any case before the domestic forum against the vessel, its
owners, or its crew.0 5 Domestic courts are not bound by any findings of fact or
law made by the Tribunal to reach its judgment.0 6 However, authorities of the
detaining state are bound to comply promptly with the Tribunal's decision con07
cerning the release of the vessel or its crew.1

101. Release of the vessel could, however, be sought as a provisional measure under Article 290.
UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 290. In M/V Saiga, the majority did not accept Guinea's argument
that the M/V Saiga was arrested for breach of a customs measure. See Lowe, supra note 5, at 194
(arguing that the minority analysis is more persuasive).
102. See M/V Saiga, 110 I.L.R. 737, 778 (Park, J., Nelson, J., Chandrasekhara Rao, J., Vukas, J.,
Ndiaye, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority did not need to decide this issue). Contra Tullio
Treves, The Proceedings ConcerningPrompt Release of Vessels and Crews Before the InternationalTibunalfor the Law of the Sea, II INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 179, 186 (1996).
103. See Lowe, supra note 5, at 195.
104. See Camouco (Pan. v. Fr.), 125 I.L.R. 164, 181-82 para. 59 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2000)
(noting "in passing" that there is a connection between the provisions, as failure to notify may inhibit the flag state's ability to act "in a timely and efficient manner");see also Monte Confurco (Sey.
v. Fr.), 125 I.L.R. 220, 242 para. 63 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2000).
105. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 292(3).
106. See MV Saiga (No. 2), 120 I.L.R. 143 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999).
107. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 292(4).

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA

B. Article 290: ProvisionalMeasures
Any of the courts or tribunals nominated in Part XV of the Convention may
prescribe provisional measures.' However, the Tribunal is given a particular role
if the case is to be heard by an arbitral tribunal that has not yet been constituted.
In these circumstances, provisional measures may be prescribed by the Tribunal,'0 9 either on the basis of agreement between the parties to the dispute, or if the
parties do not agree (either on the Tribunal or some other court or tribunal) within
two weeks of the request, on unilateral application to the Tribunal. Before prescribing provisional measures, the Tribunal must be satisfied that primafacie the
arbitral tribunal would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so
requires."0 If these conditions are satisfied, the Tribunal may prescribe measures
that it considers appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective
rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision of the arbitral tribunal."' Given the necessary
urgency, the Tribunal's Rules give applications for provisional measures priority
over all other claims-with the exception of prompt release applications-and re2
quire the Tribunal to fix the earliest possible date for a hearing.)1
Claims brought before the Tribunal on this basis make up the remainder of
the thirteen decisions of the Tribunal to date, and the Tribunal has, in five
3
claims, prescribed provisional measures.''
108. Article 290 of UNCLOS is modeled after Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, but explicitly provides that provisional measures are binding. See also Annex VI, supra
note 94, art. 25 (affirming the Tribunal's power to prescribe such measures and to do so by chamber).
109. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 290(5).
110. Id.;see also Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan) (Austl. v. Japan), 117 I.L.R. 148, 160
paras. 39-40 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999), available at http'/www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/
case-detail.plid=3&lang=en. In MOX Plant (b. v. U.K.), 126 I.L.R. 259 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea
2001), available at http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case-detail.pl ? id = 10&lang=en, the provisional measures sought by Ireland were denied on the basis that there was insufficient urgency to
justify their prescription, but the Tribunal formulated its own provisional measures based on cooperation, a feature of the decision which has been the subject of critical comment. See, e.g., Chester Brown, ProvisionalMeasures Before the ITLOS: The MOX Plant Case, 17 INT'L J. MARINE &
COASTAL L. 267, 268, 282-83 (2002).
111. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art 290(1), (5).
112. ITLOS RuiEs, supra note 34, art. 90.
113. M/V Saiga (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 117 I.L.R. 111 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1998); Southern
Bluefin Tuna Cases, 117 I.L.R. 148; MOX Plant, 126 I.L.R. 259; Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), 126 I.L.R. 487 (Int'l Trib. L.
of the Sea 2003).
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V. RESPONSE

TO LIMITATIONS ON JURISDICTION

Thus far, the Tribunal's jurisdiction has been dominated by prompt release
applications," 4 supplemented by applications for provisional measures. Rothwell suggests that there is a risk that the Tribunal "may be seen by some states as
only a court of first instance, useful for an initial hearing of the facts and for
seeking provisional measures or prompt release, but not for a final determina1' 15
tion of the dispute."
In these circumstances, what might the Tribunal do to expand its competence and relevance? Obviously, one possibility is to seek to increase its selection
as the tribunal of choice in both compulsory and consensual resolution under the
Convention. In both M/V Saiga (No. 2) "6 and the Swordfish Stocks case," t 7 the
parties agreed to transfer proceedings from arbitral proceedings to the Tribunal.
There may be advantages in referring a dispute to the Tribunal," 8 but it may also
be that a preference for confidentiality and control over the arbitral panel still
19
dictates states' choice of dispute settlement mechanism.
That possibility aside, do the prompt release and provisional measures applications that currently dominate the Tribunal's jurisdiction offer it any opportunity to contribute more generally to the interpretation of the Convention, the
development of international law, and the resolution of disputes?

114. Seegenerally Lowe and Churchill, supra note 3, at 466 (commenting that "while they must
obviously be treated with all necessary care, prompt release cases are not major international
disputes").
115. Rothwell, supra note 67, at 148.
116. See M/V Saiga (No.2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea) (Request for Provisional Measures), 117 I.L.R.
111, 114-15 paras. 12-15 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1998).
117. Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the
South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile/European Community) (Order 2000/3 of 20 December 2000),
40 I.L.M. 175, 175-78 paras. 2-3 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2000), availableat http://www.itlos.org/
cgi-bin/cases/casedetail.pl?id=6&lang=en.
118. Boyle, supra note 6, at 50-52 (setting out advantages that the Tribunal may have in relation
to the ICJ, including its competence in the law of the sea and the geographical distribution of its
members). Taking a dispute to a standing court or tribunal may also offer cost savings.
119. The assumption that disputes that could be taken to the Tribunal are being diverted to ad
hoc arbitration requires further investigation.
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A. Prompt Release Applications
1. JurisdictionandAdmissibility
Questions of jurisdiction and admissibility in applications for prompt release have raised issues of more general interest under the Convention and international law. These issues include whether a state is a "flag state" and whether a
vessel is being detained.
Only the flag state can make an application for prompt release, and in Grand
Prince,120 the Tribunal took the opportunity to comment on the definition of flag
state. It held that it had no jurisdiction over the matter, as the evidence failed to
establish that "Belize was the flag State of the vessel when the Application was
made.' 2' The Tribunal noted, in particular, that the vessel was on the Belizean
register only a very short time while the owners sought registration in Brazil and
that the circumstances of registration, crew, fishing activity, and ownership did
not suggest any "genuine link' 2 2 between the vessel and Belize. Lowe expresses
the hope that the case will serve as a "crucial step towards the correction of the
lamentable failure of the international community to get to grips with the problems of flags of convenience," noting that the "facility with which ships may
move between flags is a major impediment to the establishment of effective international regimes for the control of fishing, pollution, safety, and other matters
at sea," and on this basis, he approves of the Tribunal's willingness to deny the
123
flag state the last word on what are ships of its nationality.
Juno Trader1 24 provided the Tribunal with another opportunity to comment
on the definition of a flag state. Guinea-Bissau submitted that confiscation of the
120. Grand Prince (Belize v. Fr.), 125 I.L.R. 273 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001).
121. Id. at 300 para. 93.
122. Id. at 298 para. 82 (referring to UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 91(1), which concerns the nationality of ships and states that "[t]here must exist a genuine link between the State and the
ship"). See also id. at 303 para. 3 (declaration of Judge Wolfrom). There is also a reference to the
need for a "genuine link" in the United Nations Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art.
5, 13 U.S.T. 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. 11; see also United Nations Convention on the Conditions for the
Registration of Ships, Feb. 7, 1986, art. I, http://rO.unctad.org/ttl/docs-legal/unc-cml/
United%20Nations%20%20Convention%20on%20Conditions%20for%20Registration%20of%20
Ships,%201986.pdf.
123. Lowe & Churchill, supra note 3, at 473-76 (noting in particular the reference to "fictional
registration").
124. Juno Trader (St. Vincent v. Guinea-Bissau), 44 I.L.M. 498 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2004),
availableat http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case-detail.pl ? id = 13&lang=en.
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Juno Trader and the subsequent transfer of ownership of the vessel to the government of Guinea-Bissau meant that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was no
longer the flag state and, therefore, was not entitled to bring the claim for
prompt release. 25 However, a number of judges raised the possibility that a
26
change of ownership may not necessarily result in a change in the flag state,'
continuing the Tribunal's contribution to the general law on flag states.
Similarly, coastal states have argued that confiscation of a detained vessel
operates to deny the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 127 In Juno Trader, Guinea-Bissau argued that Article 292 has no application after a national court has given its ruling
on the merits and confiscated a vessel as a penalty for illegal fishing. 128 The Tribunal's prompt release jurisdiction was redundant because the vessel was no
longer under "arrest or detention" but rather was the property of the detaining
state. 129 France made a similar argument in GrandPrince.'
The Tribunal did not need to address the legality of this domestic penalty in
either decision. In GrandPrince,the Tribunal held that the claim was inadmissible
because Belize had not demonstrated that it was the flag state and had not therefore
demonstrated that it was entitled to bring the claim on behalf of the confiscated vessel.' 3' InJuno Trader,the Tribunal found that the decision of the Regional Court of
Bissau to suspend execution of the decision imposing a fine on the vessel also ren3 2
dered any sanction for nonpayment of the fine, such as confiscation, inapplicable.
125. Id. at 510-11 paras. 58-59.
126. Id. at 525-27 paras. 7-13 (joint separate opinion of Judge Mensah and Judge Wolfrum);see
also Juno Trader (St. Vincent v. Guinea-Bissau) (separate opinion of Judge Ndiaye) (manuscript at
8-9 paras. 28-29), http://www.itlos.org/case-documents/2004/document-en-256.pdf.
127. Confiscation of vessels and catches is a penalty imposed by the laws of many states in these
circumstances. See, e.g., Grand Prince (Belize v. Fr.), 125 I.L.R. 273, 307-08 n.3 (Int'l Trib. L. of
the Sea 2001) (separate opinion of Judge Anderson), available at http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/
cases/case detail.pllid=7&lang=en. See also Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. 498, 524 para. 3 (Int'l Trib. L.
of the Sea 2005) (joint separate opinion of Judges Mensah and Wolfrum), avialable at http://
www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case-detail.pl? id= 13&lang=en.
128. Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 510-12 paras. 58, 67, 74.
129. Id. at 511-12, paras. 67, 74.
130. Grand Prince, 125 I.L.R. at 294-95, paras. 64-66 (relying on UNCLOS art. 292(3), which
provides that the Tribunal "shall only deal with question of release, without prejudice to the merits of any case before the appropriate domestic forum").
131. Id. at 300 paras. 93-94.
132. Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 511 paras. 62-64 (noting in particular that it did not, therefore,
need to determine the effect of confiscation on nationality of the vessel); but see Juno Trader (St.
Vincent v. Guinea-Bissau) (separate opinion of Judge Ndiaye) (manuscript at 6-8 paras. 22, 2526), http://www.itlos.org/case-documents/2004/document-en-256.pdf.
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However, the legality of confiscation of a vessel is raised in a number of the
separate opinions and declarations in each decision. In GrandPrince,Judgeadhoc
Cot agreed with the majority but went on to argue that he would have denied jurisdiction in any event on the basis that the vessel was not being detained but had,
under the French criminal code, been confiscated.'33 In contrast, Judge Laing expressed doubts about the legality of such a remedy under the Convention, referring to the presumption against the legality of confiscation of property of foreign
nationals, and indicated his preliminary view that such confiscation sits uncomfortably with the coastal state's limited rights over the EEZ. He concluded that
whether confiscation is a type of measure "adopted by [the coastal state] in conformity with this Convention" would need careful consideration.134 He also suggested
that confiscation could not be legal where it would exclude the adjudicatory role of
35
an international tribunal or an entire remedial scheme.'
More recently, members of the Tribunal suggested that confiscation is legal
but subject to the demands of due process. In Juno Trader, Judges Mensah and
Wolfrum voiced their explicit support for the legality of confiscation.'36 However, they noted that such a remedy would have to be exercised within the
framework of the UNCLOS and general international law. 137 Therefore, the reversion of ownership to the detaining state by an administrative decision' 38 without any possibility of legal or administrative appeal was inconsistent with due
process and so could not be relied on to exclude the Tribunal's prompt release jurisdiction.' 39 In the same case, Judge Treves did not express a clear view on the
legality of confiscation more generally, but also referred to due process concerns,

133. Grand Prince, 125 I.L.R. at 304-05 (separate opinion of Judge Cot).
134. Id. at 313.
135. Id. at 312; see also Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 526-27 para. 12 (joint separate opinion of Judge
Wolfrum and Judge Mensah) (suggesting that UNCLOS art. 292 cannot be set aside "by mere administrative action," as this "would deprive the prompt release procedure... of all its meaning").
136. Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 524 para. 3 (joint separate opinion of Judges Mensah and Wolfrum).
137. Id.
138. In Juno Trader,confiscation was automatic on nonpayment of a fine. Id. at 509-10.
139. Id. at 524 para. 3 (joint separate opinion of Judges Mensah and Wolfrum); see also Grand
Prince, 125 I.L.R. at 313 para. 13 (separate Opinion of Judge Laing) (referring to the importance
of due process in relation to the legality of confiscation); but see id., at 305 (Declaration of Judge ad
hoc Cot) (stating that if it could be established that the confiscation was prompted by an intention
to evade UNCLOS art. 292, then the confiscation would not be effective to deny the Tribunal
jurisdiction).
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saying that "confiscation obtained in violation of due process would seem to me
abusive so that it cannot preclude an order for release."'4 0
Given the extent to which prompt release claims have dominated the Tribunal's decisions to date, there would clearly be an enormous impact on the Tribunal's role and relevance if states were able to avoid its jurisdiction by the
relatively simple measure of providing for confiscation of any ship suspected of
breaching provisions regulating fishing in the confiscating state's EEZ. If, however, as recent judgments suggest, such a remedy could not take effect without
the demands of due process being satisfied, it seems likely that the Tribunal's
prompt release jurisdiction could be activated before any domestic judicial determination to confiscate could be finally made.
2. Determinationof Prompt Release Applications
It is not clear that questions of admissibility or jurisdiction in prompt release
applications can raise issues other than whether the applicant state is the flag
state or whether the vessel is being detained. If the Tribunal's prompt release jurisdiction is established, Article 292(1) limits the Tribunal to determining
whether release of the detained vessel has been "prompt" or whether the bond
imposed for its release by the detaining state was "reasonable." There have been
some indications that the questions of promptness and reasonableness might
provide the Tribunal with opportunities to comment more generally on the
Convention, on principles of international law, and on the merits of related
claims.
So, for example, in Juno Trader, the Tribunal stated that its prompt release
jurisdiction was subject to due process and humanitarian considerations.'
Judge Treves welcomed the Tribunal's reference to these considerations but
noted that the judgment does not make clear the precise respect in which due
process and humanitarian considerations might be relevant. 4 2 He suggested a
number of respects in which these considerations may play a role, including that
a lack of due process may justify a claim that release was not prompt, "even
when the time elapsed might not be seen as excessive had it been employed in orderly proceedings with full respect of due process requirements."' 43

140.
141.
142.
143.

Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 533 para. 6 (separate opinion of Judge Treves).

Id. at 512 para. 77.
Id. at 531-32 para. I (separate opinion of Judge Treves).
Id. at 532-33 paras. 5-6.
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The Tribunal's prompt release jurisdiction is also limited by Article 292(3),
which provides that the Tribunal "shall deal only with the question of release
without prejudice to the merits of any case before the appropriate domestic forum." The Tribunal has understood this provision to prohibit consideration of
facts relevant to the merits of the dispute in proceedings for prompt release of
the detained vessel, but has nevertheless stated that the Tribunal is "not precluded from examining the facts and circumstances of the case to the extent necessary for a proper appreciation of the reasonableness of the bond."'44 The
criterion of reasonableness would appear to offer the Tribunal some opportunity
to comment more generally on the facts of the dispute. However, as Judgeadhoc
Shearer points out, the Tribunal seems "reluctant to state or enter into an evaluation of the facts other than those directly concerned with the reasonableness of
the bond for prompt release." '45
The facts "directly concerned" with the "reasonableness" of the bond are
those necessary to establish the factors identified as relevant in Camouco. These
factors are: the gravity of the alleged offenses, the penalties imposed or imposable
under the laws of the detaining state, the value of the detained vessel and of the
cargo seized, and the amount of the bond imposed by the detaining state and its
form.' 46 These factors do not offer the Tribunal significant opportunity to extend
its jurisprudence or to refer to the merits of the claim. The penalties imposed or
imposable and the amount of the bond imposed by the detaining state and its form
will be a matter of evidence. While the value of the detained vessel may give rise
to a dispute between the parties, resolution of that issue is unlikely to make significant contribution to the interpretation of the Convention, to international law
more generally, or to the resolution of the dispute. Reference to the gravity of the
alleged offenses may appear to offer more scope for an exposition of the law, but
the Tribunal has, to date, preferred to make this determination on the basis of the
47
penalties imposed or imposable under the laws of the detaining state.

144. Monte Confurco (Sey. v. Fr.), 125 I.L.R. 220, 244 para. 73 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2000); see
also Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 513-14 para. 84 (quoting Monte Confurco, 125 I.L.R. at 244).
145. Volga (Russ. v. Austl.), 126 I.L.R. 433, 482 para. 7 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2002) (dissenting
opinion of Judge ad hoc Shearer), available at http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/casedetail.
pl ?id 1 &ang=en; but cf Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 514 para. 85 ("taking into account all information provided ... by the parties" in the context of the "assessment of the relevant factors").
146. Camouco (Pan. v. Fr.), 125 I.L.R. 164, 183 para. 67 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2000); see also
Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 514-15 paras. 86-93.
147. Volga, 126 I.L.R. at 454 para. 69; see also Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 514 para. 89.
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Although the Tribunal has stated that the list of relevant factors is not
closed,' 48 attempts to expand the list and, therefore, the range of issues that the
Tribunal might consider have not met with significant success. For example, in
Juno Trader,the Tribunal held that the circumstances of the vessel's seizure were
not relevant to the reasonableness of bond.'49 In Volga, the Tribunal noted the applicant's concerns in relation to illegal fishing but did not think this was relevant
to the determination of the gravity of the offense. 5
Some members of the Tribunal have taken issue with this approach to the reasonableness of the bond imposed by the detaining state and have suggested additional factors that they consider relevant to the determination of a reasonable
bond. In Volga, Judgeadhoc Shearer expressed the view that reasonableness could
not be assessed in isolation from the "grave allegations of illegal fishing in a context of the protection of endangered fish stocks in a remote and inhospitable part
of the seas."'' In the same case, Judge Anderson expressed the opinion that the
coastal state's duty under Article 61 to ensure the conservation of the living resources of the EEZ is relevant to the determination of a reasonable bond, as are the
obligations of parties to the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources to protect the Antarctic ecosystem. 52 In Juno Trader, Judge
Treves suggested that unnecessary use of force, due process, and violation of
human rights must also be taken into consideration in fixing a reasonable bond.' 53
In Juno Trader,a number of the members of the Tribunal suggested that the
gravity of the offense cannot be assessed without reference to the nature and
strength of the evidence adduced in support of the charges and, therefore, the
likelihood of conviction.' 54 They did not think that such an assessment contra148. Monte Confurco, 125 I.L.R. at 245 para. 76.

149. Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 515 para. 95.
150. Volga, 126 I.L.R. at 454 paras. 68-69;seealsoJuno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 514 paras. 87,89 (noting concern in relation to illegal fishing in the course of considering the reasonableness of the
bond, but the reference to the gravity of the offenses being determined by reference to the penalties imposed suggested that it was not viewed as relevant).
151. Volga, 126 I.L.R. at 482 para. 7 (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Shearer).
152. See id. at para. 2; Rothwell, supra note 67, at 139 (agreeing that Article 61 "appears highly sig-

nificant to a determination of the reasonableness of a bond" but noting that "the Tribunal has not
ventured into environmental issues in its prompt release jurisprudence").
153. See Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 532-33 para. 4-5 (separate opinion of Judge Treves).

154. See id. at 519 para. 2 (joint declaration of Judges Kolodkin, Anderson, and Cot); id. at 537
para. 31 (separate opinion of Judge Lucky). Judge Lucky appears to go further, suggesting that

evaluation of the evidence is justified whenever it is necessary "for the Tribunal to arrive at an equitable decision." Id. at 537 para. 27-30.
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vened Article 292(3) by prejudicing the merits of the case. Judge Lucky, in particular, noted that if the Tribunal makes a finding on the facts, that finding will
not bind a domestic court.' 55 It was suggested that the Tribunal would "have to
weigh that gravity in the same manner as a national judge determining urgent
applications, for example, in injunctive proceedings, and find whether a prima
facie case has been made out," and that, therefore, the Tribunal would not be
56
making any finding on the merits perse.'
In addition to suggestions that reasonableness requires reference to the likelihood that the offense alleged was committed, some members of the Tribunal
have voiced concerns about the coastal state's substantive entitlement under the
Convention to impose the proposed penalties. 57 In Monte Confurco and Volga,
France and Australia's entitlement to detain the vessels was based on their entitlement to claim an EEZ around, respectively, the Kerguelen Islands and
around Heard Island and the McDonald Islands. Vice-President Vukas disassociated himself from all statements or conclusions in the decisions based on these
claims to an EEZ.' 58 In the latter decision, he explained in some detail his doubts
as to the compatibility of the claimed EEZ with Article 121(3) of the Convention, which provides that rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or continental shelf."' In Juno Trader,
Judge Kolodkin took the opportunity to reiterate that the EEZ does not form

155. See id. at 538 para. 37.
156. See id. at 538-39 para. 40. There was also some discussion of the standard of proof. Judges
Kolodkin, Anderson, and Cot drew a comparison to domestic courts determining whether to release an accused from custody, concluding that, in their view, such an approach would have justified the imposition of a lower amount for the bond in the claim before them. See id. at 519 paras.
2-3. Judge Lucky proposed that facts should be regarded as established where no evidence was
put forward by the other party to contradict them. See id. at 539 para. 42; see also Volga, 126 I.L.R.
433, 482 para. 8 (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Shearer); Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 537 para.
33 (separate opinion of Judge Lucky) (emphasizing that the decisions of domestic courts will assist
in determining whether an offense has been committed and must be respected).
157. See Oda, supra note 6, at 866. Oda had expressed doubt that the reasonableness of a bond
could be determined without consideration of the coastal state's entitlement to impose a fine
under the Convention.
158. See Monte Confurco (Sey. v. Fr.), 125 I.L.R. 220, 254 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2000) (declaration of Judge Vukas), available at http'//www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case-detail.plid=5&lang=
en; Volga, 126 I.L.R. at 460 (declaration of Vice-President Vukas).
159. See Volga, 126 I.L.R. at 463 (declaration of Vice-President Vukas). Vice-President Vukas's
declarations in both this case and in Monte Confurco are concerned with this issue alone.
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part of the territorial sea.'" He went on to note a trend in demands by coastal
states for prior notification by vessels intending to enter the EEZ, even if only for
the purpose of transit, and suggested that such demands are inconsistent with
Article 58(1) of the Convention, which guarantees freedom of navigation. 61
However, there are limits beyond which the Tribunal's Article 292 jurisdiction cannot extend. It is clear that it is not possible to claim anything beyond release of the detained vessel upon payment of a reasonable bond. So, in Juno Trader,
Judge Treves adopted a broad approach to evidence that may be relevant to a
prompt release claim, but he recognized that claims that the coastal state breached
Article 73(4) by failing to notify the flag state that the vessel had been detained remain "inadmissible as independent claims in prompt release proceedings."' 62
Moreover, there has been hesitation, even among those who have expressed
views about broader legal issues, about whether the Tribunal's prompt release
jurisdiction is the appropriate forum for considering broader questions. In
Monte Confurco, the Tribunal noted that the requirement that prompt release
claims be decided without delay "suggests a limitation in prompt release proceedings on the extent to which the Tribunal could take cognizance of the facts
in dispute and seek evidence in support of the allegations made by the parties." 163
A number of commentators share this view."6 In GrandPrince, Judge Anderson

160. See Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 518 para. 2-3 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2004) (declaration of
Judge Kolodkin) (prompted by Guinea-Bissau's use of the expression "maritime waters" to refer
to its EEZ).

161. See id. at 518 para. 4.
162. See Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 532 para. 4 (separate opinion of Judge Treves). Judge Treves
did, however, express the view that claims the coastal state failed to notify in accordance with Article 73(2) were relevant "as aspects of non-compliance with paragraph 2, in light of the common
human rights and due process dimension." The Tribunal in Juno Trader also noted that "it is not
contested that the notification to the flag State... has not been made," but it is not clear exactly
what influence, if any, this had on the Tribunal's decision. Id. at 512 para. 76.
163. Monte Confurco, 125 I.L.R. at 244. See also in Juno Trader, in which Judge Chandrasekhara
Rao observes in his separate opinion that:
The parties are seen devoting more time to the merits of their cases rather than to
the determination of reasonable bond. If the parties were to focus their attention on
the question of bond and the evidence bearing on it, the time limits specified by the
Rules would prove workable.
Juno Trader, 44 I.L.M. at 531 para. 21 (separate opinion of Judge Chandrasekhara Rao).
164. See, e.g., Lowe & Churchill, supra note 3, at 475; Rothwell,supra note 67, at 139-40; Donald
R. Rothwell & Tim Stephens, Illegal Southern Ocean Fishingand Prompt Release: BalancingCoastal
and Flag State Rights and Interests, 53 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 171,185 (2004).
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noted that this requirement also limits the ability of other states to exercise their
Article 32 right to intervene where a question of interpretation of the Conven65
tion is at issue.'
B. ProvisionalMeasures Applications
Recent decisions evidence efforts by members of the Tribunal to use the opportunities offered by applications for prompt release to develop the Tribunal's
jurisprudence, but the fact remains that the issues that can come before the Tribunal are necessarily limited. This article will next examine whether the Tribunal's provisional measures jurisdiction is similarly limited or whether it has
offered the Tribunal greater opportunity to comment on the Convention and international law or to influence resolution of disputes.
As with its prompt release jurisdiction, there are issues with which the Tribunal will have to grapple when determining whether it has jurisdiction in an
application for provisional measures. The Tribunal only has jurisdiction to
order provisional measures under Article 290(5) "if it considers that primafacie
the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction" and "the ur1 66
gency of the situation so requires."
Clearly, the Tribunal's consideration of the former issue will have broader relevance for the interpretation of the Convention's compulsory dispute settlement
provisions. A number of potential jurisdictional hurdles have not, to date, given rise
to significant controversy. In only one claim has the respondent argued that there is
no dispute, 67 and the Tribunal applied the existing body of international law 168 on
this issue.'69 When a dispute arises, the parties are obliged to proceed expeditiously

165. Grand Prince (Belize v. Fr.), 125 I.L.R. 273, 309 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001) (separate
opinion of Judge Anderson), available at http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/casedetail.pllid=
7
&lang=en. In his separate opinion in the same case, Judge Laing also makes it clear that the views
expressed are his "first thoughts" and "not to be taken as [his] decisive views." See Grand Prince,
125 I.L.R. at 309 (separate opinion of Judge Laing).
166. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 290(5).
167. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 283.
168. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 969-72 (5th ed. 2003).
169. In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, the Tribunal rejected Japan's submission that the dispute
was scientific not legal, finding that the differences between the parties also raised points of law.
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan) (Austl. v. Japan), 117 I.L.R. 148, 160 (Int'l Trib. L. of
the Sea 1999), availableat http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case-detail.pl ?id =3&lang=en. In the
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to an exchange of views, 70 and while respondents have raised the applicant's refusal
to continue with negotiations to contest jurisdiction, the Tribunal's response has
consistently been that the parties are not obliged to continue negotiations if all possibilities have been exhausted.' 7' Japan's argument that Australia and New Zealand
had not exhausted the procedures for amicable dispute settlement under Article
281 met with a similar response. 72
Compulsory jurisdiction only applies if the dispute concerns the interpretation or application of the Convention. 73 In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases,
Japan argued that the dispute concerned the interpretation or implementation
of the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna of 1993171
175
(1993 Convention) and not the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS.
The Tribunal did not deal with this argument in any great detail, finding that
the fact that the 1993 Convention applied to the dispute did not exclude Australia's and New Zealand's right to invoke the provisions of the UNCLOS in regard to the conservation and management of southern bluefin tuna. 176 The
Annex VII Tribunal agreed that the dispute, "while centered in the 1993 Convention, also arises under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
proceedings before the Annex VII tribunal, it was "common ground" that there was a dispute.
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 119 I.L.R. at 546. See Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), 126 I.L.R. 487, 498 para. 36 (Int'l Trib. L.
of the Sea 2003), available at http://www.itos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case -detail.plid=12&lang=en
(lacking a controversy between the parties that a dispute existed); MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), 126
I.L.R. 259 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001), available at http'I/www.itos.org/cgi-bin/cases/
case_detail.plid= 10&lang=en (failing to consider the dispute issue by both the Tribunal and the
Annex VII tribunal).
170. UNCLOS,supra note 1, art. 283.
171. MOX Plant, 126 I.L.R. at 274-75 paras. 54-60; see Case Concerning Land Reclamation by
Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor, 126 I.L.R. at 499 para. 48-52 (citing Land and
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 276, 303
(June 11)).
172. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 117 I.L.R. 148, 162 para. 56-60 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999).
In Land Reclamation, the Tribunal held that Article 281 did not apply to negotiations entered into
after the commencement of Annex VII proceedings, where it was agreed that the negotiations
were without prejudice to Malaysia's right to proceed with the Annex VII arbitration or to seek
provisional measures from the Tribunal. Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and
around the Straits of Johor, 126 I.L.R. 487.
173. UNCLOS, supra note 1,art. 286.
174. See generally Convention for the Conservation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna, May 10, 1993,
1819 U.N.T.S. 359.
175. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 117 I.L.R. at 161 para. 46.
176. Id. at 161 para. 52.
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Sea."' 77 However, the Annex VII Tribunal went on to Find that the 1993 Convention fell within the terms of Article 281(1) in that it was an agreement between the parties "to seek settlement of the dispute by peaceful means of their
own choice" and also found that the relevant dispute settlement provision did
"exclude any further procedure" and, therefore, denied the Annex VII Tribunal
8
jurisdiction to hear the dispute.1
In MOX Plant, the United Kingdom argued that the Annex VII Tribunal
would not have jurisdiction. In support of its argument, the United Kingdom
relied on Article 282, which provides that where the parties to a dispute have
agreed that the dispute "shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision," the compulsory procedures in the Convention will not apply. 179 The Tribunal found that Article 282 is
concerned with agreements which provide for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention. The Tribunal also
found that the other dispute settlement procedures invoked by Ireland dealt
with disputes concerning the application of those agreements and not with disputes arising under the Convention. 8 ' The Annex VII Tribunal in the Southern
Bluefin Tuna Cases found that an Article 281 agreement could exclude the Convention's compulsory dispute settlement procedures by implication. 8' In contrast, the Tribunal's approach to Article 282 is that an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism would have to specifically purport to regulate a dispute
under the Convention before it could exclude the Convention's compulsory dis82
pute settlement procedures.'

177. Id.
178. Id. at 162 para. 54-59. Justice Sir Kenneth Keith disagreed with the Tribunal on this issue,
and its decision has been subjected to criticism. See, e.g., David A. Colson & Peggy Hoyle, Satisfying the ProceduralPrerequisitesto the Compulory Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention:Did the Southern Bluefin Tuna Tribunal Get It Right?, 34 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.
59,60-61, 66-67, 69 (2003);seealso Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 117 I.L.R. at 181 (separate opinion of Judge Shearer), available at http'//www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/bluefintuna/
award080400.pdf.
179. MOX Plant, 126 I.L.R. at 272 para. 38.
180. MOX Plant, 126 I.L.R. at 273-74 paras. 48-53. Contrast the finding by the Annex VII tribunal in Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases that there was "a single dispute arising under both Conventions." Id. at 274 para. 54.
181. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 119 I.L.R. 508, 551-52 paras. 56-58 (Annex VII arbitral tribunal 2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/bluefintuna/award080400.pdf.
182. See Colson & Hoyle,supra note 178, at 73-74; Lowe & Churchill supra note 3, at 480-81.
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The Tribunal's decision is a significant contribution to the important issue
of competing dispute resolution mechanisms and, in particular, to the understanding of the compulsory jurisdiction procedures under the Convention.
However, the decision was not to be definitive. While the Annex VII Tribunal
in MOX Plant agreed that the Tribunal had primafacie jurisdiction, it acknowledged that it was possible that the dispute would fall within the exclusive competence of the ECJ and suspended proceedings before the Annex VII
Tribunal. 8 ' While the proliferation of international courts and tribunals seems
likely to keep the issue of resolution of concurrent jurisdiction on the agenda,'84
the Tribunal has arguably used its provisional measures jurisdiction to adopt a
clear position on the relationship between the Convention's compulsory procedures and other dispute settlement mechanisms.
If the Tribunal determines that it has jurisdiction, it may prescribe provi85
sional measures if it is satisfied that "the urgency of the situation so requires,"
an issue which does not have obvious relevance beyond this interim jurisdiction.
However, applicants in the relatively few provisional measures applications to
date have all relied to some extent on the precautionary principle.' 86 While the
Tribunal does not expressly adopt the precautionary approach, its references to
the need for "prudence and caution" in the face of scientific uncertainty 8 7 may

183. MOX Plant, 126 I.L.R at 267-71 paras. 20-29; see also Opinion of the Advocate General
Poiares Maduro in Case C-459/03 Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, 18 January
2006, available at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgibin/form.pl ?lang=en&Submit =Rechercher&alldocs=
alldocs&docj = docj&docop =docop&docor =docor&docjo= docjo&numaff=C459/03&datefs =&date fe
=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax= 100.
184. For example, the dispute between Chile and the European Community had also been submitted to the WTO dispute settlement procedure by the European Community, so Swordfish
Stocks could also have raised the relationship between concurrent procedures in international law.
Lowe, supra note 50, at 569; see also Rothwell, supra note 67, at 131, 146-48 (discussing competing
dispute mechanisms).
185. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 290(5).
186. See, e.g., Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 117 I.L.R. 148, 155-56 para. 28-29 (Int'l Trib. L. of
the Sea 1999), available at http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case-detail.pl?id=3&lang=en; see
MOX Plant, 126 I.L.R. at 276 para. 71; Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and
around the Straits of Johor, 126 I.L.R. 487, 502 paras. 74-75 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2003), available at http'//www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case -detail.pl? id= 12&lang=en.
187. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 117 I.L.R. at 163-64 para. 77, 79; MOX Plant, 126 I.L.R. at
277 para. 84; Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor,
126 I.L.R. 487, 504-05 paras. 95-96, 99;see also Rothwell, supra note 67, at 140, 144.
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indicate support for such an approach.'88 However, Gwenaele Rashbrooke argues that it is not certain that the references to "prudence and caution" necessarily imply application of the precautionary principle in all cases,'89 and that, even
insofar as these references contribute "to the normative value" 9 ' of the precautionary principle, "it is less clear that [the Tribunal] has contributed significantly
to clarification of the content of these principles." 9'
It is acknowledged that the provisional measures jurisdiction, like the
prompt release jurisdiction, is constrained by short time frames, which inhibit
the Tribunal's ability to develop its views.' 9 - Lowe's suggestion that "there may
be merit . . . in issuing a decision ... within the prescribed time limits but reserving the statement of the full reasoning of the Tribunal for later delivery, so
that fuller consideration can be given to the complexities of the case"'93 is made
in relation to the prompt release jurisdiction, but might equally be suggested in
relation to claims for provisional measures.
Apart from any contribution that it may make to interpretation of the Convention or to international law more generally, does the Tribunal's provisional
measures jurisdiction provide any opportunity to comment on the merits or to
promote settlement of the dispute? A provisional measures order should not

188. However, in his separate opinion in Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Judge Treves suggests that,
whatever its status in international law, reference to the precautionary approach is "a logical consequence of the need to ensure that, when the arbitral tribunal decides on the merits, the factual situation has not changed" and that a precautionary approach is "inherent in the very notion of
provisional measures." Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 117 I.L.R. at 179-80 para. 9 (separate opinion
of Judge Treyes). The separate opinion of Judge adhoc Shearer also considers the relevance of a precautionary principle or approach, concluding that the measures ordered by the Tribunal "are rightly
based upon considerations deriving from a precautionary approach." Id. at 181 (separate opinion of
Judge ad hoc Shearer). But see MOX Plant 126 I.L.R. at 293 (separate opinion of Judge Wolfrum).
See generally Brown,supra note 110, at 284-86.
189. Gwenaele Rashbrooke, The InternationalTribunalfor the Law ofthe Sea: A Forumfor the Development of Principlesof InternationalEnvironmentalLau?, 19 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 515,
530 (2004). Contra Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 117 I.L.R. at 173 (separate opinion of Judge
Laing) (viewing these statements as "pregnant with meaning").
190. Rashbrooke, supra note 189, at 534.
191. Id.; see generally id. at 521-35 (discussing the Tribunal's contribution to international environmental law).
192. Id. at 534.
193. Lowe & Churchill, supra note 3, at 475.
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prejudge the decision on the merits.'94 However, assessment of the urgency of
the measures requested will necessarily involve some preliminary assessment of
the evidence,'95 and some provisional measures may necessarily influence the
outcome of the dispute. For example, Malaysia's main concern in LandReclamation was that no environmental impact assessment had been carried out.96 One
of the provisional orders made by the Tribunal required Singapore and Malaysia
to cooperate in establishing a group of independent experts to report in no more
than a year from the date of the order.9 7 It would have been difficult to ignore
the findings of that assessment when considering the merits.
It may be argued that the Tribunal should exercise any influence it has over
the merits of the claim with caution. States may not be willing to bring applications for provisional measures to the Tribunal if they fear that this will result in,
effectively, a decision on the merits.
While any orders made by the Tribunal are necessarily interim in nature, the
Tribunal may play a meaningful dispute resolution role in provisional measures applications, whether by breaking a deadlock in negotiations or by virtue of its orders
assisting in the final resolution of the dispute. For example, in the Southern Bluefin
Tuna Cases before the Annex VII tribunal, counsel for Australia pointed out that the
provisional measures ordered by the Tribunal "already had played a significant role
in encouraging the Parties to make progress on the issue of third-party fishing," and
the agents of both applicants declared that progress in settling the dispute had been
made.'98 Although limited, the history of the Tribunal's provisional measures jurisdiction to date leads Churchill to conclude that the Tribunal "is able to play a significant role in conflict management through its provisional measures jurisdiction."" 9
194. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 12, 16 (Interim Protection Order of Aug. 17);
MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), 126 I.L.R. 259, 293 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001) (separate opinion of
Judge Wolfrum), available at http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case-detail.plid= 10&lang=en;
Brown, supra note 110, at 274; Ruediger Wolfrum, ProvisionalMeasures ofthe InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea, in THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA: LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 90, at 173, 176.
195. Lowe & Churchill, supra note 3, at 482 (commenting that in MOX Plant the Tribunal "made
no attempt to evaluate the evidence for itself").
196. Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor, 126
I.L.R. 487, 494-95 para. 22.
197. Id. at 505-06 paras. 106.
198. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 119 I.L.R. 508, 555 para. 69 (Annex VII arbitral tribunal
2000) (Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
highlights/bluefintuna/award08O400.pdf.
199. Churchill, supra note 53, at 379-80.
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CONCLUSION

Whatever the impetus behind creation of the Tribunal, 20 its present challenge is to justify its existence. While it is true that the pay arrangements for
members of the Tribunal suggest that membership of the Tribunal is not expected to be a full-time post,2 1' successive presidents of the Tribunal have noted
2°2
that the Tribunal is "not being put to full use.
The Tribunal's most recent decisions arguably demonstrate an emerging
willingness to carve out a more useful role within its existing institutional constraints. It is not yet clear that the creation of the Tribunal was a "great mistake," 2 3 and commentators remain cautiously optimistic that it may yet be
capable of relevant and robust contributions to interpretation of the Convention
and to the law of the sea.20 4 Ultimately, however, increased resort to the Tribunal
may be something over which it "will have little control. '2 ° 5
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